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Abstract. With future network equipment the security service becomes a criti-
cal and serious problem. Especially in the network, users do not want to expose
their message to others or to be forged by others. They make extensive use of
cryptography and integrity algorithms to achieve security. The sender can achieve
the high quality of security service (high security level), only if the receivers and
routers along path to receivers can support or satisfy the quality of security service
requested by the sender. Therefore, this paper proposes a protocol to provide the
needed mechanism for quality of security service, to dynamically negotiate the qua-
lity of security service among the senders and receivers of multicasts in the network.
It provides different quality of security service resolutions to different receiver nodes
with different security service needs and includes six different negotiation styles.
Keywords: Quality of security service, SSRSVP, security service negotiation, ne-
gotiation style, multicast security
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1 INTRODUCTION
The term “quality of security service” is first presented by Cynthia Irvine [4]. The
original definition is: “quality of security service refers to the use of security as
a quality of service dimension and has the potential to provide administrators and
users with more flexibility and potentially better service, without compromise of
network and system security policies.” The original definition is focused on the
quality of security service from the point of view of system administrators and users.
We refine and define the term “quality of security service” in relation to security
service negotiation among senders and receivers in a network, i.e. we focus on the
quality of security service in the network.
Definition 1 (Quality of security service). refers to security service multi dimen-
sion spaces that are composed of strength of cryptographic algorithms, length of
cryptographic key and Robustness of authentication mechanisms, etc., and is nego-
tiated among the senders and receivers in the network.
Security is very important for an Internet application. The users don’t want
to expose their message to others or be forged by others. They make extensive
use of cryptography and integrity algorithms to achieve security. Although lots of
cryptography and integrity algorithms have been suggested for Internet, if the users
want to use a different security configuration for their application, they need to use
dynamic mechanisms to negotiate quality of security service with the receivers. The
sender can achieve the high quality of security service (high security level), only if
the receivers and routers along path to receivers can support or satisfy the security
service level requested by the sender. At this time the networking community has
yet to develop a generic mechanism to solve the negotiation process for quality of
security service. The traditional session mechanism [9, 10, 11, 12] between the
sender and receiver is only suited to the Point-to-Point case, because one obvious
security service negotiation paradigm would have the sender transmit a negotiation
request towards the receiver. However, the point-to-multipoint and multipoint-to-
multipoint case [13, 14] is very difficult to solve using the session mechanism. In
particular, one must not assume that all the receivers of a multicast group possess
the same security capacity for processing incoming data, nor even necessarily desire
or require the same quality of security service from the Internet. At the same time,
the membership in a multicast group can be dynamic. To solve the above problems,
we propose an extended RSVP [1, 2, 3] protocol called SSRSVP (security service
RSVP) to provide the needed mechanism for quality of security service, to dyna-
mically negotiate the quality of security service among the senders and receivers of
multicast on the Internet. It provides different quality of security service resolutions
to different receiver nodes in a multicast group with different security service needs.
However, the SSRSVP is different to [15, 16, 17], which describe the format and use
of RSVP’s INTEGRITY object to provide hop-by-hop integrity and authentication
of RSVP messages, and can support the IPSEC protocols [17]. SSRSVP is not to
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enhance or support RSVP security function but to provide different security service
negotiation among the senders and receivers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we pro-
pose the SSRSVP model with its characteristics. In Section 3, SSRSVP for quality
of security service is described. We present SSRSVP mechanism in Section 4. Sec-
tions 5 and 6 present the negotiation styles of SSRSVP and one complete example
to illustrate the setup process of SSRSVP, respectively. Section 7 discusses other
problems of SSRSVP. The Section 8 outlines a simple implementation, and the final
section concludes the paper.
2 SSRSVP MODEL
The SSRSVP model similar to RSVP [1, 3] is illustrated in Figure 1. In the model,
a quality of security service negotiation request of SSRSVP is passed to two decision
modules – admission control and policy control, where admission control determines
whether this router has sufficient available security processing capability to support
the negotiation request, and policy control determines whether the user has suffi-
cient privilege to make this request. If both decisions are positive, the corresponding
parameters of SSRSVP are set. The classifier module determines the quality of se-
curity service (QOSS) level for each packet in the host or router. SSRSVP defines
a session as a packet flow, and each session is treated independently by SSRSVP.
A SSRSVP session is defined by its IP destination address, protocol ID, and Des-
tination port. The security process module in the model implements the security
processing per packet, including the confidentiality and integrity function, etc. Since
the quality of bandwidth service is not important in SSRSVP, the packet scheduler
is less important than the one in RSVP.
When a packet arrives a router without SSRSVP module, it checks route ta-
ble information and forwards the packet.When a packet arrives a router with the
SSRSVP module and the correct configuration, the router would do the following:
1. The classifier module determines the quality of security service (QOSS) level
for each packet according to IP destination address, protocol Id and destination
port.
2. The security process module extracts information from the QOSS database of
SSRSVP according to the QOSS of the packet arrived. The database infor-
mation includes: keys, cryptography algorithms, and quality of security service
information negotiated with next hop, etc.
3. The security process module of the router will re-encapsulate the packet accord-
ing to quality of security service information negotiated with next hop.
4. The router forwards the packet to next hop according to route table information.
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Fig. 1. SSRSVP model in hosts and routers
3 EXTENDING RSVP FOR QUALITY
OF SECURITY SERVICE (SSRSVP)
A RSVP message consists of a common header, followed by a body consisting of
a variable number of variable-length, typed objects.
The fields in the common header of RSVP [2] are shown in the Figure 2.
0 1 2 3
Vers Flags Msg Type RSVP Checksum
Send TTL (Reserved) RSVP Checksum
Fig. 2. Common header of RSVP
No flag bits are defined yet to extend RSVP for quality of security service. Here
we propose to define 1001(0x09) in Flags field (4 bits) to denote the RSVP for the
quality of security service. In the RSVP common header, the Msg type (8 bits)
includes the Path, Resv, PathErr, ResvErr, PathTear, and ResvTear and ResvConf
message types.
When the Flags are equal to 0x09, we propose that the Msg type field will
become the SSRSVP message type, which is as follows:
Msg Type: 8 bits
• 1 = Spath,
• 2 = Snego,
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• 3 = SpathErr,
• 4 = SnegoErr,
• 5 = SPathTear,
• 6 = SnegoTear,
• 7 = SnegoConf,
• 8 = KeyMess,
• 9 = Keyfail,
• 10 = KeySucc.
4 SSRSVP MECHANISMS
SSRSVP, similarly to RSVP [1], adopts receiver-initiated design principles: Re-
ceivers choose the quality of security service negotiation request and are responsible
for initiating and keeping the negotiation active as long as they want to receive the
packet. It is the receiver who knows its own limitation of the security processing
capacity; furthermore, the receiver is the only one who experiences, and thus who is
directly concerned with, the quality of security service experienced by the incoming
data. Additionally, if network charging were deployed in the future, the receiver
would likely be the party paying for the requested security service. Thus, it should
be the receiver who decides what security service should be negotiated.
There are three fundamental SSRSVP message types: “Snego”, “Spath” and
“KeyMess” illustrated in Figure 3.
Each SSRSVP sender host transmits SSRSVP “Spath” messages downstream
along the uni-/multicast routes provided by the routing protocols, following the
paths of the packet. These “Spath” messages store “path state” in each router along
the way. This path state includes at least the unicast IP address of the previous
hop router, which is used to route the ”Snego” messages hop-by-hop in the reverse
direction.
Each SSRSVP receiver host sends SSRSVP negotiation request (“Snego”) mes-
sages upstream towards the senders. These messages must follow exactly the reverse
of the paths the packets will use on their way upstream to all the sender hosts in-
cluded in the sender selection.
When the SSRSVP negotiation request is finished, the Sender host transmits
SSRSVP “KeyMess” messages downstream along the “Path” to the next hop, which
includes negotiation acknowledgement information and the key information of qua-
lity of security service negotiated with next hop. The process is shown in Figure 3
and described as follows:
1. The sender hosts first send the “KeyMess” message to the router1, which in-
cludes negotiation acknowledgement information and the key information of
quality of security service that router1 uses to decrypt data packets encrypted
by sender. If the processing of the “KeyMess” transmission results in failure, the
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“KeyFail” message is returned to the sender, otherwise the following operations
are performed.
2. The router1 will send a “KeyMess” message that includes negotiation acknow-
ledgement information and key information of quality of security service that
router2 uses to decrypt data packets encrypted by router1. The “KeyMess”
that router1 sends is different to the “KeyMess” that router1 received from the
sender. If this process fails, router2 returns “KeyFail” to router1, and then
router1 returns “KeyFail” to the sender. If the above process succeeds, the
following operations are performed.
3. If, at last, router3 succeeds in transferring “KeyMess” to the receivers, the re-
ceiver returns the “KeySucc” message to router3, and router3 will return “Key-
Succ” message to router2, and so on, until finally the sender receives the “Key-
Succ” message. The Sender then begins to transfer the data along the “path”
to the receivers.
We omit to detail the process of “KeyMess” transmission in this paper, be-
cause there are many mechanisms to implement it, e.g. the sender host first genera-
tes the session key “K” and encrypts the “KeyMess” (i.e. EK(KeyMess)), then
the sender host uses the public key of router1 to encrypt the session key “K”
and encrypted KeyMess (i.e. Erouter1(K,EK(KeyMess). At last, the sender uses
the private key to encrypt a timestamp, encrypted “KeyMess” and session key
(i.e. Esender(timestamp, Erouter1(K,EK(KeyMess)), and forwards it to router1. The
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Fig. 3. SSRSVP mechanism
At each intermediate router, a “Spath” message triggers three general actions as
follows (Note, the “Spath” message must pass the authentication and policy control
of router):
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1. The intermediate router adds the previous hop address in the SSRSVP Hop field
of the “Spath” message.
2. The intermediate router stores the information it extracts from the “Spath”
message. The information includes the Sender Template, which describes the
format of packet that the sender will originate. The Sender Template specifies
the IP destination address, protocol ID and destination port. The security
properties of the Sender specify the scope of quality of security service that is
used to indicate the maximal and minimal security processing capability of the
sender and claimed quality of security service level limit for receivers.
3. The intermediate router forwards the “Spath” message downstream towards the
receivers along with uni/multicast routes provided by the routing protocols.
At each intermediate router, a “Snego” message triggers two general actions, as
follows:
1. The SSRSVP module of the router passes the “Snego” request to the admis-
sion control engine and policy control. If either test fails, the negotiation re-
quest is rejected and the SSRSVP process returns a “SnegoErr” message to the
receiver(s). If both succeed, the router will return the confirmation message
(quality of security service) to the receiver(s), and the confirmation message
indicates the quality of security service installed in the network. If the quality
of security service level limit is claimed in the “Spath” message of sender, the
router will check the quality of security service level of negotiation request of
the receivers. If the negotiation request level is below the limit claimed by the
sender, the router will reject the negotiation request of the receiver. When the
receiver receives “SnegoErr” message from the router, the receiver will resend
the negotiation request at a higher of high quality of security service level if the
receiver has sufficient security processing capability. If the receiver has not the
necessary security processing capability, it can’t receive the packets from the
sender.
2. The intermediate router makes negotiation mergence according to the negotia-
tion style claimed by the receiver, and then a new negotiation request message
is propagated upstream towards senders by the router.
The “SpathErr”, “SnegoErr”, “SpathTear”, and “SnegoTear” messages are si-
milar to the message types of RSVP [1]. We omit to further describe them in the
article due to constraints on the article length.
5 NEGOTIATION STYLE OF SSRSVP
From the point of view of RSVP, a sender can always transmit data, whether or not
an adequate bandwidth service exists in the network to deliver the data. However,
since the quality of security service is different to the quality of (bandwidth) service,
senders don’t want to expose their message to others or be forged by others during
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transmission in the network. The sender sometimes can only hope when transferring
packets that the receivers’ quality of security service level is not below the limit
claimed by the sender. Therefore, with SSRSVP, the sender can force the receivers to
keep quality of security service level of negotiation request above the limit claimed by
sender. Of course, the sender will always use the maximum security processing level
to encapsulate data packets and forward them to next hop (router with SSRSVP)
regardless of the negotiation request level from the next hop. To solve the problem,
we hope to use a negotiation style to guarantee it. The negotiation style of SSRSVP
is different to the reservation style RSVP [1]. We classify the style of SSRSVP into
two categories: limit (i.e. LWF, LFF and LSE negotiation style) and non-limit (i.e.,
FF and SE negotiation style).
We discuss the negotiation style of SSRSVP in the following terms. Let a ne-
gotiation request be (SQi). SQi denotes the quality of security service level of
negotiation request from the th receiver. Infsj()means the quality of security ser-
vice level negotiated from the receivers is not below the limit claimed by the th
sender host. Since the non-limit negotiation style of SSRSVP is the same as the
reservation style of RSVP [1], we omit to further describe it. We defined the limit
negotiation styles as follows.
LWF style: (∗max[Infsi(SQi)]) and WF style: (∗max(SQi)) i ∈ (1, . . . , n)
During the LWF style negotiating process, separate negotiation requests are
merged into one negotiation request for each upstream sender.
LFF style: (S1 max[Infs1(SQi)], S2 max[Infs2(SQj)]) and FF style: (S1
max(SQi), S2max(SQj)) (i, j ∈ (1, . . . , n))
Assume that S1 and S2 denote the sender1 and sender2 .The LFF style negotia-
tion request creates a distinct negotiation for data packets from a particular sender,
not sharing them with packets of other senders for the same session.
LSE style: ((S1, S2){max[Infs1(Infs2(SQi))]}) and SE style: ((S1, S2){(SQi)})
(i ∈ (1, . . . , n))
The LSE style negotiation request creates a single negotiation shared by selected
upstream senders. Unlike the LWF style, the LSE style allows a receiver to explicitly
specify the set of senders to be included.
6 SSRSVP EXAMPLE
Users hope that their data packets are transferred with confidentiality and integrity
in the network. To conveniently explain the SSRSVP example, suppose the quality
of security service level is defined as the following Figure 4.
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show one example of negotiation request from one source
node to the four receiver nodes by using FF and LFF style, respectively.
Because SSRSVP is a receiver-oriented request protocol similar to RSVP [1],
receivers R1, R2, R3, and R4 will initiate a LFF style SSRSVP request. Suppose
the router1, router2, router3, router4 and router5 have available security processing
capability to support the SSRSVP negotiation request. Assume that the quality of
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Fig. 4. Quality of security service level
security service level of negotiation request from receivers R1, R2, R3, and R4 is 4S,
2S, 1S and 5S, respectively.
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Fig. 5. One complete SSRSVP negotiation request example from one source node to the
four different receiver nodes using FF style
In the Figure 6, since the negotiation request level of the receiver3 is below the
limit claimed by sender1, the Router5 rejects the negotiation request of sender1.
If the max quality of security service level of the receiver3 is 1S, the receiver3
will never receive any data packets from the sender1. Of course, if 1S is not the
max security process capability of receiver3, the receiver3 will try to sends the
negotiation request of high quality of security service level to the Router5 when the
receiver3 receives the “SnegoErr” message.
When the negotiation request is finished, the sender node S1 sends the “Key-
Mess” that includes negotiation acknowledgement information and the Key informa-
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Fig. 6. One complete SSRSVP negotiation request example from one source node to the
four different receiver nodes using LFF style
tion of quality of security service that router1 uses to decrypt data packets encrypted
by the sender. When the Router1 receives the “KeyMess” from the sender1, the
router1 sends negotiation acknowledge information and key information of quality
of security service that the router2 and router3 will use to decrypt data packets
encrypted by the router1, respectively. When all of the receiver nodes receive the
upstream “KeyMess” message, the SSRSVP setup is successful. The detailed process
is illustrated in the Figure 7 and Figure 8 by Using FF and LFF style, respectively.
7 DISCUSSION ABOUT SSRSVP
7.1 Tear, Error Message and Policy Control
SSRSVP “teardown” messages remove path or negotiation state immediately. There
are two types of SSRSVP teardown message: SpathTear and SnegoTear. A Spath-
Tear message travels towards all receivers downstream from its point of initiation
and deletes path state, as well as all dependent negotiation state along the way.
A SnegoTear message deletes negotiation state and travels towards all senders up-
stream from its point of initiation. Similarly, there are two SSRSVP error message:
SpathErr and SnegoErr. SpathErr message sent upstream to the sender that created
the error, and they do not change path state in the routers though which they pass.















































































Fig. 7. One complete SSRSVP negotiation request and KeyMess example from one source
node to the four different receiver nodes by using FF style
A negotiation request of quality of security service that fails Admission Control
creates SnegoErr.
The router will spend plenty of CPU and memory cost when it implements the
cryptography algorithms for quality of security service of receivers. To prevent CPU
and memory resource abuse by users, reliable user identification and selective ad-
mission will generally be needed when negotiation for quality of security service is
requested. “Policy control” is used for the mechanisms required to support access
policies and back pressure for SSRSVP negotiation for quality of security service.
SSRSVP carries POLICY DATA objects. Policy data may include credentials iden-
tifying users or user levels, account numbers, limits, etc.
7.2 SSRSVP Refresh and Non- SSRSVP Clouds
In the context of a SSRSVP-enabled network, a soft state refers to a state in router
and end router that can be updated by certain SSRSVP messages. The soft state
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Fig. 8. One complete SSRSVP negotiation request and KeyMess example from one source
node to the four different receiver nodes by using LFF style
characteristic permits a SSRSVP network to support dynamic group membership
changes and adapt to changes in routing. In general, the soft state is maintained by
a SSRSVP-based network to enable the network to change states without consul-
tation with ends. To maintain a security negotiation state, SSRSVP tracks a soft
state in the router and host. The SSRSVP soft states are created and must be
periodically refreshed by Spath and Snego messages. SSRSVP periodically scans
the soft state to build and forward Spath and Snego refresh messages to succeeding
hops. When a route changes, the next Spath message initializes the path state on
the new route. When state changes occur, SSRSVP immediately propagates those
changes from end to end within a SSRSVP network. If the received state differs
from the stored negotiation state, the stored state is updated. If the result modifies
the refresh messages to be generated, refresh messages are generated and forwarded
immediately. A host sends IGMP messages to join a multicast group and SSRSVP
Messages to negotiate quality of security service along the delivery path(s) from
that group. Each router that is capable of participating in negotiating quality of
security service passes incoming active packets to a packet classifier. The SSRSVP
packet classifier determines the route and quality of security service level for each
packet.
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It is impossible to deploy SSRSVP at the same time throughout the entire In-
ternet. Therefore, SSRSVP must provide correct protocol operation even when
two SSRSVP-capable routers are interconnected via an arbitrary cloud of network
routers. An intermediate cloud that does not support SSRSVP is incapable of per-
forming security negotiation, so quality of security service guarantees cannot be
made. To support connection of SSRSVP networks through traditional networks,
SSRSVP supports tunneling, which occurs automatically through non-SSRSVP net-
works. Tunneling requires SSRSVP and non-SSRSVP routers to forward Spath mes-
sages toward the destination address by using a local routing table. When a Spath
message traverses a non-SSRSVP cloud, the Spath message-copies carry the IP ad-
dress of the last SSRSVP-capable router. Snego messages are forwarded to the next
upstream SSRSVP-capable router.
8 SIMPLE IMPLEMENTATION
Different negotiation styles and quality of security service will bring different impacts
on the performance of a router. Consider an experiment consisting of one sender,
three receivers and two routers, which are PCs, as illustrated in Figure 9.
 
Fig. 9. Experiment paradigm
In the experiment, let the 64 bits DES [5] and MD5 [6] be the quality of security
service first level (i.e. 1S). Let be 3DES[7] and MD5 be the quality of security
service second level (i.e. 2S). Let be 1024 bits RSA [8] andMD5 be the quality of
security service third level (i.e. 3S). The DES, 3DES and RSA are used to ensure the
confidentiality of packets. The MD5 is used to ensure the integrity of packets. We
test the relation of processing throughput of packet with the utilization of CPU and
RAM of router1 and router2 when the two different negotiation styles of SSRSVP are
used in our experiment. The simulation experiment results are shown in Figure 10
and Figure 11.
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The simple experiment shows that the CPU capability to process algorithms
for confidentiality and integrity is a bottleneck to improved network throughput.
Although it is feasible to implement algorithms for confidentiality and integrity by
software in the router, we can see that the throughput of network processing is
improved only if the algorithms for confidentiality and integrity are implemented by
hardware modules in a router.






Figure 10.Throughput of  node (M bytes/s)
 LFF negotiation style
 FF  negotiation style
 
Fig. 10. Throughput out node2 (Mbytes/s)
 Fig. 11. Throughput out node2 (Mbytes/s)
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9 SUMMARY
With future network equipment the security service becomes a critical and serious
problems. Especially in the network, users don’t want to expose their message to
others or to be forged by others. They make extensive use of cryptography and
integrity algorithms to achieve security. The sender can achieve the high quality
of security service (high security level), only if the receivers and routers along path
to receivers can support or satisfy the quality of security service requsted by the
sender.
To solve above the problems, we propose an extension of RSVP called SSRSVP
(security service RSVP) to provide the needed mechanism for quality of security
service, to dynamically negotiate the quality of security service among the senders
and receivers of multicasts on the Internet. It provides different quality of security
service resolutions to different receiver nodes with different security service needs.
In this paper, SSRSVP is proposed, which differs from RSVP [1] in the following
three aspects.
RSVP [1] is used to guarantee the quality of (bandwidth) service negotiation.
SSRSVP is designed to provide a flexible mechanism to guarantee the quality of
security service negotiation among senders and receivers in the network.
There are two fundamental message types in the RSVP [1] (e.g. Path and Resv
message). In SSRSVP, we define three fundamental messages: “Spath”, “Snego” and
“KeyMess”. The “KeyMess” message includes the negotiation acknowledgement and
key information of quality of security service.
Since quality of security service is different from the quality of (bandwidth)
service, the sender is given the right to force receivers to keep quality of security
service level of negotiation request above limit claimed by the sender and to ensure
confidentiality and integrity of the sender’s data packets during transmission in the
network. Therefore, we make small change in the style of RSVP [1]. We extend the
reservation styles of RSVP [1] to negotiation styles of SSRSVP, which includes WF,
FF, SE, LWF, LFF and LSE.
Detailed discussion of security consideration for SSRSVP is omitted in the paper.
We only propose a mechanism of SSRSVP for negotiating quality of security ser-
vice, which could provide different quality of security service resolutions to different
receiver nodes with different security service needs.
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